Looking at Stage 1
Stage 1 is what I call the silent stage. What happens in this stage happens over a period of time and can be almost invisible to the casual observer. Those who are tuned in notice these things immediately, but, for the general public, it is a slow process, akin to putting a frog in cold water and then slowly boiling it.
Stage 1: Early Democratic Erosion – A Checklist in Action
Democracies rarely collapse overnight. More often, they erode in stages, through small shifts that feel
“normal” in the moment but add up to something dangerous. Stage 1 is where the warning lights first
start to blink: trust frays, rhetoric hardens, and institutions are quietly weakened.
Below, each item in the Stage 1 checklist is paired with:
- A historical example that shows how this pattern has played out before.
- A current parallel that suggests where similar dynamics may be emerging now.
1. Erosion of trust in democratic institutions
When citizens lose faith in elections, courts, and legislatures, it becomes easier for would‑be
authoritarians to argue that “the system” is broken and must be bypassed or replaced.
Historical example – Weimar Germany:
In the 1920s and early 1930s, economic crisis, political fragmentation, and relentless propaganda
undermined confidence in the Reichstag and democratic parties. Many Germans came to see parliamentary
democracy as chaotic and ineffective, creating fertile ground for anti‑system movements like the Nazis
who promised order and national renewal.[1]
Current parallel – United States:
In recent years, surveys have shown declining trust in Congress, the courts, and especially in the
integrity of elections. International indices now classify the U.S. as a “flawed democracy,” citing
polarization, institutional gridlock, and contested election outcomes as key drivers of democratic
erosion.[2][3]
2. Leaders framing political opponents as existential threats
Democracy assumes that opponents are rivals, not enemies—that they can lose today and win tomorrow.
When leaders insist that the other side is a mortal danger to the nation, compromise becomes betrayal,
and hardball tactics become easier to justify.
Historical example – Peru under Alberto Fujimori:
In the 1990s, President Fujimori portrayed opposition parties, the legislature, and parts of the
judiciary as obstacles to stability and progress. By framing them as corrupt and dangerous, he
justified an “autogolpe” (self‑coup) in 1992, dissolving Congress and ruling by decree.[4]
Current parallel – U.S. political rhetoric:
Across the political spectrum, but especially in populist rhetoric, opponents are increasingly
described as existential threats to the country’s survival—“destroying America,” “enemies of the
people,” or “traitors.” Research on democratic backsliding links this kind of language to rising
polarization and a weakening of democratic norms of mutual toleration.[5]
3. Increasing use of conspiracy narratives to explain political setbacks
Conspiracy theories offer a simple story: if “we” lose, it can’t be because others disagreed—it must
be because shadowy forces cheated. That story is deeply corrosive to democratic legitimacy.
Historical example – Interwar Germany:
After World War I, myths like the “stab‑in‑the‑back” conspiracy claimed that Germany had not truly
been defeated on the battlefield but betrayed by internal enemies. These narratives delegitimized
democratic leaders and parties, painting them as traitors rather than legitimate political actors.[1]
Current parallel – Global disinformation and “rigged” narratives:
In multiple countries experiencing democratic backsliding, leaders and parties have embraced
conspiracy narratives to explain electoral losses or unpopular decisions—blaming “deep states,”
foreign plots, or massive fraud. Comparative research highlights this pattern in cases such as
Hungary, India, and Turkey, where disinformation and conspiracy‑driven politics have become central
tools of autocratization.[6]
4. Attacks on independent media as “biased,” “fake,” or “enemies”
Free media are a core democratic safeguard. When leaders systematically discredit journalists and
independent outlets, they weaken one of the main checks on power.
Historical example – Argentina’s military regime (1976–1983):
During the “Proceso” dictatorship, the junta censored, intimidated, and co‑opted media outlets.
Critical reporting was suppressed, and many journalists were threatened, disappeared, or forced into
exile, allowing the regime to control the public narrative and hide widespread human rights abuses.[7]
Current parallel – United States and other democracies:
In recent years, prominent political figures have labeled independent media “fake news,” “enemies of
the people,” or tools of hostile elites. This rhetoric, combined with online harassment and legal
pressure, has contributed to a more hostile environment for journalists and weakened public trust in
independent reporting.[5][6]
5. Growing tolerance for political violence in rhetoric
Democracy depends on the idea that conflicts are settled with ballots, not bullets. When violent
language becomes normalized, it lowers the barrier to actual violence.
Historical example – Chile before the 1973 coup:
In the early 1970s, Chilean politics became increasingly polarized. Street clashes, armed groups, and
escalating rhetoric about “civil war” and “national salvation” eroded democratic norms and helped set
the stage for the military coup that overthrew President Salvador Allende in 1973.[8]
Current parallel – Threats and intimidation in the U.S. and elsewhere:
Scholars and monitoring organizations have documented rising threats against election workers, local
officials, and legislators, along with rhetoric that hints at or openly endorses political violence.
Public opinion surveys show a worrying minority of citizens in several democracies expressing
conditional support for violence if their side loses.[9]
6. Declining transparency in government decision‑making
When decisions move into back rooms—away from public scrutiny and institutional oversight—citizens
lose the ability to hold leaders accountable, and informal power networks gain strength.
Historical example – Japan in the 1930s:
As militarists gained influence, key decisions about foreign policy and war were increasingly made
within the military and a small circle of elites, bypassing civilian institutions. This opaque
decision‑making process helped accelerate Japan’s drift into authoritarianism and expansionist war.[10]
Current parallel – Autocratizing regimes:
In countries like Turkey, Russia, and Venezuela, observers have documented a shift toward opaque
executive decision‑making, weakened parliamentary oversight, and restricted access to government
information. These changes are consistently associated with declines in democratic quality and
accountability.[6]
7. Expansion of executive power through “emergency” language
Emergencies are real—but they can also be exploited. When leaders invoke crises to bypass normal
checks and balances, temporary measures can quietly become permanent.
Historical example – India’s Emergency (1975–1977):
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a national Emergency, suspending civil liberties, censoring the
press, and jailing opposition leaders. Although elections eventually resumed, the episode remains a
classic example of how emergency powers can be used to centralize authority and weaken democratic
institutions.[11]
Current parallel – Tunisia’s recent trajectory:
Since 2021, President Kais Saied has invoked emergency justifications to suspend parliament, rule by
decree, and rewrite the constitution. International observers have described this as a sharp
reversal of Tunisia’s post‑Arab Spring democratic gains.[12]
8. Attempts to delegitimize courts or regulatory bodies
Independent courts and regulators are speed bumps for would‑be strongmen. When leaders attack them as
illegitimate or “politicized,” they prepare the ground for capture or neutralization.
Historical example – Hungary under Viktor Orbán:
Beginning in 2010, Orbán’s government used constitutional amendments, changes to retirement ages, and
new appointment rules to reshape the judiciary. Critics argue that these moves undermined judicial
independence and concentrated power in the hands of the ruling party.[13]
Current parallel – Political attacks on courts in the U.S. and elsewhere:
In several democracies, leaders have increasingly denounced courts as partisan actors when rulings go
against them, floated court‑packing or defiance of judicial decisions, and sought greater control over
judicial appointments. Comparative research identifies such attacks as a common early sign of
democratic backsliding.[5][6]
9. Normalization of corruption or conflicts of interest
When corruption is treated as “just how politics works,” it erodes public trust and turns state
institutions into tools for private gain and political loyalty.
Historical example – Venezuela under Chávez and Maduro:
Over time, corruption became deeply embedded in Venezuela’s political and economic system. Access to
state resources was often tied to political loyalty, and institutions meant to provide oversight were
weakened or captured. This contributed to both democratic breakdown and severe economic crisis.[14]
Current parallel – Patronage and state capture in backsliding regimes:
In many contemporary cases of democratic erosion, ruling parties use public contracts, regulatory
favors, and selective enforcement to reward allies and punish critics. International watchdogs
highlight this pattern as both a symptom and a driver of democratic decline.[6]
10. Shrinking space for civil society and watchdog groups
Civil society organizations—NGOs, advocacy groups, watchdogs, professional associations—are the
nervous system of a democracy. When their space shrinks, citizens lose crucial channels for voice and
oversight.
Historical example – Russia since the 2000s:
The Russian government has progressively restricted NGOs and independent civic groups, especially
those receiving foreign funding. Laws labeling organizations as “foreign agents” or “undesirable”
have been used to stigmatize, harass, or shut down critical voices in civil society.[15]
Current parallel – Pressure on civil society in democracies:
Even in formally democratic systems, civil society organizations can face pressure through funding
cuts, burdensome regulations, legal threats, and delegitimizing rhetoric. Researchers warn that when
watchdog groups are weakened, corruption rises and citizens have fewer tools to resist democratic
erosion.[6]
Why Stage 1 matters
None of these signs, by itself, guarantees democratic collapse. But together, they mark a shift in the
political weather—a move away from pluralism, accountability, and shared rules of the game. The point
of a Stage 1 checklist is not to induce panic, but to sharpen perception: to notice patterns early
enough that citizens, institutions, and leaders of good faith can still change course.
Democracies don’t just belong to presidents, courts, or parties. They belong to the people paying
attention.
References
- [1] Richard J. Evans,
The Coming of the Third Reich (Penguin, 2004). - [2] Freedom House,
“Freedom in the World 2024 – United States,”
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2024/united-states
. - [3] Economist Intelligence Unit,
“Democracy Index 2023,”
https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2023/
. - [4] John Crabtree,
Fujimori’s Peru: The Political Economy (Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998). - [5] Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt,
How Democracies Die (Crown, 2018). - [6] Varieties of Democracy (V‑Dem) Institute,
“Democracy Report 2024,”
https://www.v-dem.net
, and Freedom House,
“Freedom in the World 2024,”
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2024
. - [7] Committee to Protect Journalists,
“Attacks on the Press in Argentina (1976–1983),” archival reports,
https://cpj.org
. - [8] Peter Winn (ed.),
Victims of the Chilean Miracle (Duke University Press, 2004). - [9] Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI),
“Competing Visions of America: An Evolving Threat of Political Violence,”
https://www.prri.org
, and Brennan Center for Justice,
“Intimidation of Election Officials,”
https://www.brennancenter.org
. - [10] Louise Young,
Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (University of California Press, 1998). - [11] Granville Austin,
Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (Oxford University Press, 1999). - [12] International Crisis Group,
“Reversing Tunisia’s Authoritarian Drift,” and Freedom House country report on Tunisia 2024,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia
. - [13] Kim Lane Scheppele,
“The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not Work,”
Governance 26(4), 2013, and reports by the European Commission on the rule of law in Hungary. - [14] Transparency International,
“Venezuela: Country Profile,”
https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/venezuela
. - [15] Human Rights Watch,
“Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups,”
https://www.hrw.org
, and Amnesty International reports on Russia’s “foreign agents” law.